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Post-Conflict Administrations as
Democracy-Building Instruments
Jean d'Aspremont*
The period that stretches from the end of the Cold War until today has
weathered the emergence of a large number of new states. With each addition,
the international community has striven to regulate statehood and rein in its
most erratic and unpredictable manifestations.' In particular, the international
community has tried to affect what kind of political regimes are set up in these
new states. The multi-dimensional administration established by States or
International Organizations to (re)build governmental institutions in territories
where the governments have floundered completely have constituted an useful
instrument to reach that goal. This strategy, while costly, has not been
unsuccessful. Through international administrations of territories, several states
have been rebuilt or restored, all of them endowed with democratic institutions.
It is the aim of this Article to analyze the use of international administrations of
territories to create or to reconstruct democratic states. After briefly recalling the
status of democracy in international law (Section I), the Article explains how
modern administrations of territories have proven to be democracy-building
machines (Section I1). Finally, it offers a critical appraisal of the contemporary
resolve of the international community to create democratic states (Section I11).
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS: DEMOCRACY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is little doubt that the end of the Cold War and the sweeping fallout
of that event on the international plane have impinged significantly on
international law and some of its most fundamental principles. International
legal scholars promptly recognized that the post-Cold War international legal
order had become more amenable to the prominent role of democracy.
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For a discussion of one example of this phenomenon, see generally Jean d'Aspremont, Regulating
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American liberal scholars, in particular, have enthusiastically supported the idea
that democracy today plays a crucial role in the international legal order and have
swiftly provided various optimistic accounts of the extent of the legal changes
brought about by democracy.2 French positivist lawyers, although they have
usually voiced greater skepticism and refrained from embracing the whole array
of consequences that liberals attached to a lack of democracy, have also
recognized that democracy can play a role in the international legal order.'
Even if one does not agree with all the legal consequences that American
liberals have associated with the emergence of democracy in the international
legal order,' it can hardly be contested that living up to some democratic
standards corresponds with an international customary obligation. Indeed,
contemporary practice shows that, to a large degree, states consider the adoption
of the main characteristics of a democratic regime to amount to an international
obligation and act accordingly toward nondemocratic states.' It is of particular
relevance that many nondemocratic states do not oppose the principle of
democracy, and even claim that they are themselves in the midst of progress

2

3

The most radical liberal view on this question is probably offered by Fernando R. Tes6n, The
Kantian Theogy of InternationalLaw,92 Colum L Rev 53, 54-55 (1992) (presenting and defending the
two Kantian arguments for the international human rights imperative). For milder forms of the
democratic entitlement theory, see Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging R'ght to Democratic Governance,
86 Am J Intl L 46, 46 (1992) ("Democracy... is on the way to becoming a global entitlement,
one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes.");
Christina M. Cema, UniversalDemocragy: An InternationalLegal Right or the Ppe Dream of the West?, 27
NYU J Intl L & Pol 289, 329 (1995) ("At a time when international organizations are routinely
under attack for not solving all the world's problems we should pause to marvel at the giant step
that the recognition of democracy as an international human right portends for the peoples of the
world."). For an overview of how participatory rights emerged in international law, see generally
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalPartidpationin InternationalLaw, 17 Yale J Ind L 539 (1992)
(tracing the emergence of participatory rights in international law through the development of
treaties and principles derived from UN-sponsored election monitoring guidelines and arguing
that this process signals an emerging universal right to political participation). For a basic account
of the arguments for and against the democratic entitlement theory, see generally Gregory H. Fox
and Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democraty and Its Implicationsfor InternationalLaw,
in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, eds, Democratic Governance and International Law 1, 11
(Cambridge 2000).
See Jean d'Aspremont, L'Etatnon dimocratique en droit international.Etude critique du droitpositifet de la
praique contemporaine (Pedone 2008). For earlier analyses, see generally Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
L'O.N.U. et la dimocratisationde l'Etat: Systmes rgionaux et ordrejutidiqueuniversel 31 (Pedone 2000);
Pierre Klein, Le droit aux ilections libres en droit international:Mythes et ralits,in Olivier Corten, et al,
eds, 1 A la recherche du nouvel ordre mondial 93, 95-98 (Eds Complexe 1993); Rafa Ben Achour, Le
droit international de la democratie, TV Cursos Euromediterrdneos Bancaja de Derecho International 327
(2000).

4

For one criticism of the liberal theories of democracy, see Jean d'Aspremont, L'Etat non
democratique en droit international(cited in note 3).
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towards the establishment of democracy.6 In that sense, nondemocratic states,
with a view of strengthening the legitimacy of their government, try to portray
their political regime in a democratic fashion rather than choosing to dispute the
role that democracy plays in the international order.
Nonetheless, this customary legal obligation to adopt a democratic regime
must not be exaggerated-such overreaching is where the aforementioned
liberal theories about democracy prove unconvincing First, the scope ratione
materiae of the principle of democracy in international law is limited, as the
obligation rests on only an electoral and procedural understanding of democracy. 8
States are customarily obliged to abide by democracy to the sole extent that their
effective leaders (or the parliamentary body that oversees their executive

6

7
8

For one example, consider the recent events in Pakistan. In particular, see the interview of
President Musharraf on November 11, 2007, Carlotta Gall, David Rohde, and Jane Perlez,
Rebuffing US, MusharrafCalls Crackdown Crucial to a Fair Vote, NY Times Al (Nov 14, 2007)
("Dressed in a dark business suit rather than his military uniform, General Musharraf spoke in a
confident tone, saying the decree was justified because the Supreme Court had questioned the
validity of his re-election, and because of the seriousness of threats from terrorists."). Musharraf
has since stepped down from military leadership, see, for example, David Rohde and Carlotta
Gall, In Musharrafs Shadow, a New Hopefor Pakistan Rises, NY Times A3 (Jan 7, 2008) (describing
President Musharraf's decision to step down as army leader and serve as Pakistan's civilian
President). Also relevant are the developments in Myanmar. On this issue, see, for example, Seth
Mydans, Manmar Claims Step To Democray, ButJunta Still Grips to Power, Intl Herald Trib N3 (Sept
4, 2007); see also Larry Diamond, Developing Democray: Toward Consolidation 8-9 (Johns Hopkins
1999) (explaining that, while the electoral concept of democracy has expanded to address
criticisms, it might still fail to address political marginalization that excludes significant segments
of the population from exercising their democratic rights).
See the criticism raised by d'Aspremont, L'Etatnon dimocratique (cited in note 3).
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Paricipation in International Law, in Fox and Roth, eds,
Democratic Governance and InternationalLaw 48, 49 (cited in note 2):
While democratic consequentialists argue persuasively that a whole range of
civil rights and social prerequisites may be necessary for meaningful popular
consent, the fact of consent still lies at the heart of their theories....
International law's modest approach to democratization, therefore, has
focused on electoral processes.
For criticism of this "minimalistic" understanding of democracy, see Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora,
and Richard Wilson, Low Intensity Democracy, in Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson,
eds, Low Intensiy Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order 3, 21 (Pluto 1993); Diamond,
Developing Democra'y at 8-9 (cited in note 6) (explaining that, while the electoral concept of
democracy has expanded to address criticisms, it might still fail to address political marginalization
that excludes significant segments of the population from exercising their democratic rights); J.
Roland Pennock, DemoraticPolitical Theogy 3-15 (Princeton 1979); Richard Burchill, Book Review,
The Developing InternationalLaw of Democray, 64 Modem L Rev 123, 128 (2001) (reviewing Fox and
Roth, eds, Democratic Governance and International Law (cited in note 2)); Russell A. Miller, SelfDetermination in InternationalLaw and the Demise of Democragy, 41 Colum J Transnad L 601, 603-05
(2003) (criticizing Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Franck for adopting "anemic" definitions of
democracy in order to proclaim democracy's triumph).
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mandate) are chosen through free and fair elections.9 Likewise, this customary
obligation, while being ega omnes,10 is certainly not of ajus cogens character, as it is
underscored by the existence of numerous persistent objectors to that customary
rule."
It would also be a mistake to consider the obligation to be democratic
utterly groundbreaking. The development of a new customary norm in this area
is unsurprising, given that international law has long regulated some aspects of
states' political regimes. Through human rights law, the international community
has regulated the way in which power is exercised. It has also prohibited some
types of political regimes-for example, apartheid 2 and, to a lesser extent,
fascism.' 3 Moreover, the obligation to organize free and fair elections is not
entirely new in the international legal order, as a similar obligation is already
embedded in the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, 4 which
has been ratified by 161 States. 5 It must be pointed out, however, that even if
9

10
11

12

13

14

15

d'Aspremont, L'Etat non democratique en droit internationalat 15 (cited in note 3).
Id at 291.
The People's Republic of China and several states in the Middle East can probably be considered
persistent objectors to that rule. See, for example, Andrew J. Nathan, The Tiananmen Papers, 80
Foreign Aff 2 (Jan/Feb 2001), adapted from Zhang Liang, compiler, Andrew J. Nathan and Perry
Link, eds, The Tiananmen Papers (Public Aff 2001).
See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
(1973), 1015 UN Treaty Set 243 (1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), art 3, 660 UN Treaty Ser 195 (1969) ("States Parties
particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and
eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction."); see also Security
Council Res No 288, UN Doc S/RES/288 (1970); Security Council Res No 277, UN Doc
S/RES/277 (1970); Security Council Res No 253, UN Doc S/RES/253 (1968); Security Council
Res No 232, UN Doc S/RES/232 (1966); Security Council Res No 216, UN Doc S/RES/216
(1965); Security Council Res No 217, UN Doc S/RES/217 (1965); General Assembly Res No
1791, UN Doc A/RES/1791 (1962); General Assembly Res No 1598, UN Doc A/RES/1598
(1961); Security Council Res No 221, UN Doc S/RES/221 (1961).
In particular, see General Assembly Res No 36/162, UN Doc A/RES/36/162 (1981) ("Measures
to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and neo-Fascist activities and all other forms of totalitarian
ideologies and practices based on racial intolerance, hatred and terror.').
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Res 2200A, UN Doc
A/6316 (1966) ("ICCPR"). On the ICCPR and democracy, see generally Andreas Mavrommatis,
The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rsghts and Its Role in Promoting Democracy, in Kalliopi
Koufa, ed, Human Rights and Democrayfor the 21st Centugy 255 (Sakkoulas 2000).
See Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004),
available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008). On the
possible ratification of the ICCPR by the People's Republic of China, see Katie Lee, China and the
InternalionalCovenant on Civil and PoiticalRights: Prospects and Challenges, 6 Chinese J Intl L 445 (2007)
(evaluating the prospects for the ICCPR's ratification by the Chinese government and
determining China will likely be receptive to prerequisite domestic legislative reforms); see also
the signature of the ICCPR by Cuba on February 28, 2008 and the possible ratification in the
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the international legal order enshrines a principle of procedural democracy
applicable to the political regime of states, there is no corresponding
requirement of democracy applicable to the structure and the functioning of the
international legal system as a whole. This is not totally astonishing, given the
inapplicability of the classical domestic blueprints of governance to the
international system.16
Despite its limited ambit, democracy has borne observable legal
consequences. This is especially true in connection with the ability of states to
take countermeasures to sanction violations of democracy. Indeed,
notwithstanding the reserving clause adopted by the International Law
Commission, 7 there is a fair amount of practice as well as scholarship
buttressing the idea that, in the case of the violation of democracy, all states-or
at least those states party to the ICCPR, when the obligation only arises under
that treaty-are entitled to take countermeasures against the offending state. 8
Given the dramatic impact such sanctions may have, one should not
underestimate the importance of such a remedy.
Leaving sanctions aside, it is paradoxical that the most significant effects
that democracy may have in international law do not necessarily correspond to
the legal consequences attached to its absence. Besides constituting a customary
international legal obligation, democracy has become a fundamental criterion for
the legitimization of governments in the sense that, nowadays, a new
government hardly qualifies as the legitimate representative of a state if it has not
been democratically elected. 9 This formidable development is not a
consequence of the obligation to have democratic institutions, but rests on the
discretion of states to choose whether to recognize a new government. There is
indeed no such obligation not to recognize nondemocratic governments. As
mentioned above, the obligation to be democratic does not constitute ajus cogens

16

17

1

19

future, Cuba Signs Rights Treaties at UN, with Reservations, Ind Herald Trib (Feb 28, 2008), available
online at <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/28/news/UN-Cuba-Human-Rights.php>
(visited Apr 5, 2008).
See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of InternationalLaw: Governance, Democray and Legitimacy, 64
HeidelbergJ Intl L 547 (2004).
See International Law Commission, Responsibilioy of Statesfor Internationaly Wrongful Acts, art 54,
General Assembly Res No 56/83, UN Doc A/56/49/Vol I/Corr 4 (2001).
See the practice mentioned by the Special Rapporteur in its commentary on Article 54, UN
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN Doc A/56/10, 1372001report.htm>
39 (2001), available online at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/
(visited Apr 5, 2008) ("ILC Report"). See also Christian J. Tams, Enforcing ObligationsErga Omnes
in International Law 220-21 (Cambridge 2005). See d'Aspremont, L'Etat non-dimocratique en droit
internationalat 300 (cited in note 3).
On this question, see Jean d'Aspremont, Legitima of Governments in the Age of Democragy, 38 NYU J
Intl L & Pol 877 (2006).
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norm. Even if it were a jus cogens norm, it is not certain that a state, in
recognizing a nondemocratic government, would also recognize as legal the
violation of the obligation to be democratic.20 This discretionary practice of
recognizing only new democratic governments-and despite the fact that States
have toned down the solemnity of their recognition 2 1-- does, however, bear
substantially on the content of the rules of the international legal order, whose
majority now constitute democratic states in the procedural sense mentioned
above.
The same can be said about the emergence of new states on which this
Article focuses. Statehood is an intrinsically factual phenomenon that remains
outside the ambit of regulation by international law 2 2-let alone the influence of
the criterion of legality on the recognition of a State. 23 The mere fact that there is
a customary obligation is of no direct consequence as regards the factual process
leading to the (re)construction of a state. Prior to statehood, a nascent country
is, ex hypothesis, not bound by any democratic obligation. The other countries or
the international organizations that are supervising its (re)construction or
administrating its territory in the transition period are not bound under
international law to establish democracy as the political regime of the emerging
state. The customary obligation to ensure that the determination of the executive
powers be carried out through democratic elections does not embody an
additional and specific obligation to guarantee that any new states be democratic.
Naturally, this does not mean that the emergence of new states is of no
legal relevance. 24 The foregoing only indicates that the protracted factual process
that leads to the formation of a new legal subject unfolds irrespective of any
international legal requirements pertaining to the type of institutions. In other
words, the systematic creation of a democratic state through international
administrations of territories by international organizations or individual states
acting collectively could have occurred in the absence of an international
obligation that compels states to be democratic. This is precisely why the
practice related to the post-conflict restoration of states proves to be so
remarkable. While not itself the result of the obligation to be democratic, the
modern practice pertaining to the post-conflict administration of territories can,
in turn, lead to dramatic transformation of the international legal system. Indeed,
as post-conflict administrations favor the creation of democratic states, this
20

d'Aspremont, L'Etat non-dimocraliqueen droit internationalat 151 (cited in note 3).

21

d'Aspremont, Legitimafy of Governments at 901, n 98 (cite in note 19).

22

See generally d'Aspremont, Regulating Statehood (cited in note 1).

23

See the difficulties pertaining to the application of the obligation not to recognize enshrined in

24

Article 41 of the ILC Report at 113-16 (cited in note 18).
Id.
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practice increases the number of democratic states in the international arena,
thereby enhancing the customary obligation to be democratic. This is why it is of
the utmost interest to briefly outline how new states are nowadays made
democratic (Section II) and critically appraise the fundamental changes that this
practice may provoke in the international legal order (Section III).

II. POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS AS
DEMOCRACY-MAKING BODIES
The phenomenon of a foreign state or an international organization
administering a territory is not entirely new.2 The contemporary practice is
nonetheless unprecedented in several respects. One novelty rests on the extent
of powers that member states have been ready to bestow upon the organizations
that have been involved in international administrations of territories. These
powers very often exceed those with which these organizations originally were
endowed. It is noteworthy that such an extension was hardly disputed by
member states of the organization concerned. 26 This Article is not concerned
with these powers, but rather focuses on the other innovative dimension of
these international administrations and, more especially, the types of institutions
and governmental structure to which the restoration is directed. There is no
need to refer extensively to a practice that has already been widely examined. It
only matters for the sake of this Article to recall that the establishment of
democratic institutions has been systematically included in the mandate of all
post-conflict administrations since the end of the Cold War. It must be pointed
25

See Carsten Stahn, InternationalTerritorialAdministrationin the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments

26

and Challenges Ahead, 61 Heidelberg J Ind L 107, 108-09 (2001) (noting that, for example, the
League of Nations authorized states to administer the former colonies and dependent territories
in the wake of World War I and that the UN created a trusteeship system for the administration
of territories after World War II); Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of
InternationalTerritoialAdministration,95 Am J Ind L 583, 586 (2001) (same); Yves Daudet, L'action
des Nations Unies en matire d'administration territoriale, in Jorge Cardona Llorens, ed, VI Cursos
Mediterrdneos Bancaja de Derecho Internacional 459 (2002). For a general historical overview of the
practice of trusteeship, see William Bain, Between Anarchy and Sodety: Trusteeship and the Obligationsof
Power (Oxford 2003).
Daudet, L'action des Nations Unies in Llorens, ed, VI Cursos Mediterrineos Bancaja de Derecho

27

International at 485 (cited in note 25). See generally Michael Bothe and Thilo Marauhn, UN
Administration of Kosovo and East Timor. Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated
Trusteeship Administration,in Christian Tomuschat, ed, Kosovo and The InternationalCommuniy 231-36
(Kluwer 2002) (describing the limits on the Security Council's powers to establish an international
administration). Consider Stahn, InternationalTerritorialAdministrationat 129-33 (cited in note 25)
(assessing the legal basis for the UN to assume positions of temporary governance that exceed its
trusteeship mandate).
See generally Marc Cogen and Eric De Brabandere, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, 20 Leiden J Intl L 669 (2007). For an earlier account of this practice, see Jean
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out that these post-conflict administrations mostly have been concerned with
the establishment of electoral and procedural democracy.28 In that respect, the
concept of democracy underlying this practice dovetails with the minimalist
understanding of democracy reflected in international law as is explained above
in Section I.
A.

EARLY ATTEMPTS

Somalia probably constitutes the first case where international post-conflict
administration was envisaged in the post-Cold War period, although the idea
ultimately faltered.29 It is, however, Bosnia that saw the first actual
implementation of post-conflict administration3" following the Dayton
Agreement," which provided that "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a
democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and
democratic elections. ' 3 2 Despite some recent political turmoil3 3 and serious
difficulties looming large, it has never been disputed that Bosnia Herzegovina
emerged as a democratic state.
B.

EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND IRAQ

1. East Timor
The international administration of the territory of East Timor has been
the most wide-ranging post-conflict reconstruction operation to date. In
accordance with the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor, the

28

d'Aspremont, La criaion internationale d'Etats dimocraiques, 109 Revue Gtn6rale de Droit
International Public 889 (2005). See also Michaela Salamun, Democratic Governance in International
TerritorialAdministration59 (Nomos 2005).
For the contribution of post-conflict administrations to other dimensions of democracy, consider

29

Cogen and De Brabandere, Democratic Governance at 685, 689 (cited in note 27) (describing freedom
of association and freedom of expression as the two other pillars of democracy in post-conflict
reconstruction situations).
See generally Security Council Res No 814, UN Doc S/RES/814 (1993).

30

31

32

33

Somalia probably constitutes the first case where international post-conflict administration was
envisaged in the post-Cold War period, although the idea ultimately faltered. See generally id.
Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina-Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), 35 ILM 170 (1996)
("Dayton Agreement"). For more information on this topic, see J.M. Sorel, L'accorddepaix sur la
Bosnie-HerZgovine du 14 dicembre 1995: Un traiti sous binfice d'inventaire, 41 Annuaire Fran~ais de
Droit International 65 (1995).
Bosnia and Herzegovina Const, art 1.2 (cited in 35 ILM 117 (1996)).
See Nicholas Wood, Dire Bosnia WarningsMeet with Ske ticsm; Talk of InstitutionsFaiing or Conflict, Is
Overblown, Many Analysts Maintain,Intl Herald Trib N3 (Nov 20, 2007) (describing fears of crisis in
Bosnia as largely exaggerated).
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United Nations tried to organize a referendum to determine how the people of
the territory wished to exercise that right.3 4 When violence ensued, the Security
Council authorized the use of force,3" but subsequently set up the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor ("UNTAET") in accordance
with the recommendation of the Secretary General.36 UNTAET was "endowed
with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and...
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority."3 The Security
Council also bestowed upon UNTAET the obligation to organize a new
referendum" in accordance with the requirements set by the International Court
of Justice for the exercise of self-determination. 3 The establishment of
democratic institutions was not, however, directly included in the mandate
devised by the Security Council. In the 1999 Resolution 1272, the Security
Council highlighted the need to "carry out [this] mandate effectively with a view
to the development of local democratic institutions, including an independent
East Timorese human rights institution, and the transfer to these institutions of
its administrative and public service functions." 4 ' The duty of UNTAET had
already been advocated by the UN Secretary General 1 and reflected a consensus
among major powers that the territory's institutions should be democratic. 42 It is
therefore not surprising that following its independence and upon its accession

34
35

36

See United Nations, Report of theSecretag-General,UN Doc A/53/951, Annex II, 24-28 (1999).
See Security Council Res No 1264, UN Doc S/RES/1264 (1999). On this topic, see Gerard
Cahin, L'action internationale au Timor oriental, 46 Annuaire Frangais de Droit International 139,
143-44 (2000).
See United Nations, Report of the Secretagy-General on the Situation in East Timor, UN Doc
S/1999/1024, 26 (1999) (proposing, subject to Security Council approval, the establishment of a
transitional administration in East Timor, which "would be empowered to exercise all legislative
and executive authority, including the administration of justice").

37

See Security Council Res No 1272, UN Doc S/RES/1272 (1999).

38

Id at 8. See also United Nations, Report of the Secretay-Generalon the Situaion in East Timor at
(cited in note 36).

39

See Advisory Opinion No 61, Western Sahara,12 ICJ

40

Security Council Res No 1272 at 8 (1999) (cited in note 37).
United Nations, Report of theSecretar-Generalon the Situaion in East Timor at IV (cited in note 36)
(proposing the establishment of a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, to
be "endowed with the overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor" and
"empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of
justice").
Cahin, L'acion internaionaleau Timor orientalat 161-62 (cited in note 35); see also d'Aspremont, La
criation internalionale d'Etats dimocratiques at 900 (cited in note 27); John Moore, Australia Accepts a
Limited UN Assignment in East Timor, Intl Herald Trib (Sept 23, 1999), available online at
<http://www.iht.com/aricles/1999/09/23/edmoore.t.php> (visited Apr 5, 2008); Alan Dupont,
For East Timor, a Tough Transition to Independence, Intl Herald Trib (Sept 6, 1999), available online at
<http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/09/06/eddupont.2.t.php> (visited Apr 5, 2008).

41

42
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to the United Nations in 2002, East Timor could claim to be a democratic state.
Despite some unrest, the successive elections organized in East Timor
confirmed the democratic character of this new state.43 On top of underpinning
the earlier practice of creation of democratic states by post-conflict
administrations, the case of East Timor also demonstrated that the exercise of
classical self-determination in the context of decolonization must now lead to
the emergence of a democratic state. 44

European Union Election Observations Mission, Final Report: East Timor PresidentialElections: 14
April 2002, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external-relations/human-rights/
euelection-ass observ/east_timor/reportO2.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008); European Union
Election Observations Mission, Final Report: East Timor ConstituentAssembly Elections: 30 August
2001, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemalrelations/human-rights/eu_
election_assobserv/eastsimor/reportOl.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008); European Union Election
Observation Mission, PreliminaryStatement: East Timor PariamentaryElections: 30 June 2007, available
online at <http://www.eueomtimorleste.org/parl/PDF/EUEOM%/20TL%/20Parliamentary/20
Elections%20FINAL.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008); European Union Election Observation Mission,
Preliminaa Statement: East Timor Presidential Elections: 9 April 2007, available online at
<http://www.eueomtimorleste.org/Pre/PDF/PRELIMINARY%/2OSTATEMENT/20EUEO
M%20TL%2010%20April%2007.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
44

This development was in line with the various agreements pertaining to the future exercise of selfdetermination by the people of Palestine. See, for example, Israel-Palestine Liberation
Organization, Declaration of Prindples on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (1993), 32 ILM 1525,
1528, art III.1 ("In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern
themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be
held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation."). See also US
Department of State, Press Statement, A Performance-BasedRoadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-PalestinianConflict (Apr 30, 2003), available online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2003/20062.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008):
A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved
through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a
leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a
practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's
readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be
established ...

The idea that the exercise of classical self-determination must lead to the emergence of a
democratic State is also reflected in President George W. Bush's wish of an agreement between
Israel and Palestine to negotiate a peace treaty by the end of 2008. See President George W. Bush,
Address
at the Annapolis
Conference
(Nov 27, 2007),
available
online
at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127-2.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008)
('We meet to lay the foundation for the establishment of a new nation: A democratic Palestinian
state that will live side by side with Israel in peace and security."). For reporting on President
Bush's remarks at the Annapolis Conference, see Steven Lee Myers and Helene Cooper, Mideast
Treay Vowed by End of 2008; Agreement Creates Structurefor Talks, but Doesn't Address Fundamental
Issues, Intl Herald Trib NI (Nov 27, 2007). On the exercise of self-determination and the creation
of democratic states, see d'Aspremont, La creation internationaled'Etats democratiques at 889 (cited in
note 27).
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2. Kosovo
It rapidly became clear that the post-conflict administration in East Timor
would not remain unique. Indeed, the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and the
violations of human rights in that territory prodded the Member States of
NATO to launch the bombardment of Yugoslavia. 4' Falling short of
determining the final status of that territory, the international community
established a new post-conflict administration. Contrary to the situation in East
Timor, there was no doubt that this administration was endowed with an
express mandate to build democratic institutions on that territory.4 6 It was
subsequently clarified by the international community 47 that whatever the final
status of the territory would be, the democratic character of the Kosovar
institutions could not be questioned.48 This was confirmed by the regulations
adopted by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"). 49 The 2007
Kosovo Status Settlement devised by the UN Special Envoy echoed this
objective. Indeed it was made clear that the new territory would not be
recognized as a state or admitted to the United Nations and the Council of

45

46

See generally Tomuschat, ed, Kosovo and the InternationalCommunity (cited in note 26). See also
Specal Symposium: The InternationalLegalFalloutfromKosovo, 12 EurJ Intl L (2001); Tarcisio Gazzini,
NATO Coercve Militan Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis 199-1999, 12 Euro J Intl L 391 (2001).
See generally Security Council Res No 1244, UN Doc S/RES/1244 10 (1999) (authorizing an
international civil and
administration).

military presence in Kosovo and placing it under interim UN

47

But see the abstention of the People's Republic of China on the occasion of the vote on UN

48

Security Council Res 1244. UN SCOR 54th Sess, 4011th mtg at 9, UN Doc S/PV.4011 (1999).
See also Peter Hilpold, HumanitarianIntervention: Is there a Needfor a Legal Reappraisal?12 Eur J Ind
L 437, 441 (2001) ("It was also the G8 which drafted Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted
on 10 June 1999 with 14 votes in favour and only China abstaining.").
See UN Security Council, Statement by the Presidentof the Securiy Counil,UN Doc S/PRST/2003/26
(2003) ("The Security Council recalls the eight standards, namely: functioning democratic
institutions; rule of law; freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property
rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protection Corps."). For further details, see
d'Aspremont, 20 Leiden J Intl L at 649 (cited in note 1).

49

See United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo, Reg 2001/1, UN Doc
UNMIK/REG/2000/1 (2001), available online at <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/
2001/regOl-01.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (on the approval of a Kosovo Joint Interim
Administrative Structure); see also United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo,
Reg 2001/9 (2001), available online at <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/regO901.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (establishing the Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment in Kosovo). For an analysis, see Carsten Stahn, Constitution Without a State? Kosovo

under United Nations ConstitutionalFramework for Self-Government, 14 Leiden J Intl L 531 (2001)
(assessing the changes wrought by the constitutional framework through an analysis of the legal
instruments governing Kosovo's institutional system throughout the last thirty years and previous
international practice in the field of territorial reconstruction).
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Europe if it failed to be democratic.5 0 Although the Kosovo Status Settlement
has not been endorsed by the Security Council and the admission of Kosovo to
the United Nations seems barred by Russia, the substance of the Settlement's
main provisions has inspired the behaviors and the reactions of most western
countries following the unilateral declaration of independence adopted on 17
February 2008.51
3. Iraq
Although not constituting a full-fledged post-conflict administration, the
powers exercised by a few states in Iraq were also directed at the establishment
of a new democratic governmental apparatus. The democratic requirement did
not, however, concern the interim government, as the interim government was
only due to be representative of the various political, religious, and ethnic
components of the Iraqi society, and was not required to be duly elected.52 It was
not until Resolution 1546 (2004) that the Security Council pointed to the need to
establish a democratic government in Iraq and confirmed the importance of
holding direct democratic elections.5 3 On June 28, 2004, the Coalition
occupation of Iraq ended, and the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"),
which had administered Iraq since the fall of the former regime, was dissolved.
An appointed Iraqi interim government wielded authority from June 2004 until
the Transitional Government of Iraq was formed in May 2005 by the

50

51

For an analysis of the Kosovo Status Settlement, see d'Aspremont, 20 Leiden J Intl L at 649 (cited
in note 1).
See, for instance, the European Union COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/124/CFSP of 4
February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, which corresponds to
the mission envisaged in the UN Kosovo Status Settlement, Official Journal, L 42/92 (Feb 16,
2008); see also U.S. and EU Powers Recognise Kosovo as Some FearPrecedent, Intl Herald Trib (Feb 18,
2008), available online at < http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/02/18/europe/OUKWD
-UK-KOSOVO-SERBIA.php> (visited Apr 5, 2008). The late recognition of the Netherlands is
particularly in line with the UN Kosovo Status Settlement as this country postponed its
recognition to ascertain that the new entity will abide by human rights. The recognition by the

Netherlands is noted in Angry about Kosovo, Serbian Nationalist Utges Unioy Toward EU, Int Herald

52

Tribune (Mar 4, 2008), available online at <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/04/europe/
serbs.php> (visited Apr 5, 2008), while the conditions upon which the recognition of the
Netherlands were based are mentioned in The Netherlands Recognizes Kosovo, New Kosova Report
(Mar 4, 2008), available online at <http://www.newkosovareport.com/20080304694/politics/The-Netherlands-recognises-Kosovo.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
See Security Council Res No 1483, UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003); Security Council Res No 1500,
UN Doc S/RES/1500 (2003); Security Council Res No 1511, UN Doc S/RES/1511 (2003).

53

Security Council Res No 1546, UN Doc S/RES/1546 (2004). See United Nations, Report of the
10, 16, 22, UN Doc
Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph24 of Securijy Council Resolution 1483
S/2003/715 (2003); President George W. Bush, Address at the American Enterprise Institute
(Feb 26, 2003), transcript available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/02/20030226-11 .html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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Transitional National Assembly, members of which were directly elected for this
purpose by the Iraqi people in January 2005. Even though the establishment of
democratic institutions in Iraq did not ultimately ease the violence, it confirmed
the similar practice observed in the cases of Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo.
III. THE DEMOCRATIC STANDSTILL AND THE MARCH TOWARD
A UNIVERSAL COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC STATES
The practice pertaining to the creation and restoration of states outlined in
the previous section demonstrates that there is hardly any example of the
creation/restoration of a new state in which the international community is
involved where that state is not endowed with democratic governmental
structures. It is worth mentioning that the trend is not limited to post-conflict
administration, but also embodies the exercise of classical self-determination and
the reconstructions of states short of any exercise of power by an international
organization or foreign states.5 4 Against this backdrop, one can hardly dispute
the manifest leaning towards the establishment of democracy by the
international community whenever it or some of its members partake in the
configuration of new states.
The relevance of the aforementioned international creation of democracies
must be read in conjunction with the contemporary practice pertaining to coups
d'etat especially when they come at the expense of democratic governments.
Today, the community of states does not tolerate democratic states being
stripped of their democratic trappings. Governments that seize power through a
coup d'etat against a democratic government are systematically denied
representation within international organizations,5 5 typically through
nonrecognition" or refusal of accreditation.5 7 This means that, on the one hand,
54

The case of Afghanistan provides one such example. See Agreement on ProvisionalArrangements in

Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, available online at

55

56

<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("Bonn
Agreement"); United Nations, Letter Dated5 December 2001 from the Secretagy-GeneralAddressed to the
President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2001/1154 (2001) (endorsed by the UN Security Council
in Security Council Res No 1383, UN Doc S/RES/1383, 1 (2001) ("Welcoming the letter of 5
December 2001 from the Secretary-General informing the Council of the signature in Bonn on 5
December 2001 of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the
reestablishment of permanent government institutions. . ")). For an analysis, see d'Aspremont,
L'Etat non dimocralique en droit internationalat 75 (cited in note 3).
On the reactions against coups, see generally Jean d'Aspremont, La question de la liciiti du 'coup
d'Etat' en droit international Proceedings of the Societ6 Franaise pour le Droit International
(Pedone 2008).
See, for example, the coup in Haiti and the reaction of the OAS Member States.
OEA/Ser.F/V.A, MRE/RES.1/91 corr 1 (1991); see also African Union, Algiers Declaration,
AHG/Decl.1 (XXXV), available in Declarations and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fifth
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new states are provided with democratic structures or encouraged to adopt them
and, on the other hand, that those states that are democratic can no longer
change their political regime to a less democratic form of government. In other
words, as soon as a nondemocratic state has made a significant leap towards
democratic governance, the international community no longer tolerates this
state shedding its commitments to democracy. These two phenomenainternational creation of democratic states and rejection of coups d'etats against
democratic governments-thus constitute the bedrock of what can be seen as a
principle of democratic standstill. This corresponds to the idea that a newly
reached status cannot be legitimately downgraded, a principle already enshrined
in human rights law.58 As far as democracy is concerned, it would of course be
an exaggeration to interpret this tendency as reflecting any international legal
norm similar to that which exists in human rights law. The practical fallout
nonetheless remains the same: democratic states cannot expunge the democratic
attributes of their political regime.
This democratic standstill that permeates contemporary practice is
symptomatic of the ineluctable character of democracy's success. There is little
doubt that more and more states will become democratic in the procedural and
electoral sense described in Section I. It must be highlighted that this seemingly
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, available online at <http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/9HoGAssemblyl999.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008). See also
AHG/Dec.142 (XXXV), available in Declarations and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fifth
Assembly of Heads of State and Government 23 (deciding that "Member States whose
Governments came to power through unconstitutional means after the Harare Summit, should
restore constitutional legality before the next Summit"); see generally General Assembly 55/96 on
the promotion and the consolidation of democracy.
57

In the 1990s, the UN accredited five governments that lacked actual territorial control over their
respective states-Haiti, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Liberia, and Afghanistan. See, for example, the
decisions of the UN General Assembly Credentials Committee pertaining to the competing claims
by the authorities in Liberia. United Nations, Credentialsof Representatives to the Fifty-Second Session of
the General Assembly, UN Doc A/52/719
8 (1997). Consider Matthew Griffin, Accrediting
Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy through Its
Accreditation Process, and Should It?, 32 NYU J Ind L & Pol 725, 725 (2000) (arguing "that though
the Credentials Committee has begun, at least selectively, to take account of democracy, it is far
from adopting a rule, in the sense of a legal rule of universal application, that limits participation
in the General Assembly to representatives of democratic governments'). See generally Fox, The
Right to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw at 588-607 (cited in note 2) (suggesting, in 1992,
that the UN should enforce the international obligation of participatory democracy by linking
election results to accreditation).

58

See, for example, European Convention on Human Rights (1950), art 53, available online at
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/O/
EnglishAnglais.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008); Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights, art 29 (Nov 22, 1969),
available online at
<http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm> (visited Apr 5,
2008); ICCPR, art 5 (cited in note 14).
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compelling march toward a global community of democratic states does not
stem from any dogmatism or allegedly universal values-and it is precisely the
absence of dogmatism which bolsters the movement's success.5 9 In other words,
it is argued here that the significant espousal of the democratic pattern draws
upon the practical effects of democracy. It is because (procedural) democracy
boils down to a successful means to foster effectiveness of governments that it
has thrived. Indeed, a government that is deemed democratic by the
international community will enjoy a greater international effectiviti.60 Likewise, a
government that rests on democratic elections-provided that the electoral
process has been successfully completed-will enjoy a much stronger internal
effectiviti.6' The success of the democratic model of governance draws on these
significant practical benefits, more than the values that it may represent.
This consensus on the positive practical effects of democracy does not
necessarily signal that the emergence of a universal community of democratic
states is in sight. The rise of powerful nondemocratic states may delay that
ambition for some decades. As illustrated by the rise of the People's Republic of
China and its increasingly influential foreign policy, conditioning economic and
trade benefits on democratic requirements may take a back seat.62 In a world
where democratic states already constitute a solid majority and are growing in
number-thanks to the use of post-conflict administrations to build democratic
states, among other things-and where the rules of the international legal order
now show amenability to democracy, the impediment that these few states may
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60

61

62

See Jean d'Aspremont, Contemporary InternationalRulemaking and the Public Character of International
Law, NYU Global Law Working Paper 08/06 & Institute for International Law and Justice
Working Paper 2006/12, available online at <http://iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-12dAspremont-web.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
Effectiviti is a term of art, without a true equivalent in English. It means that the government has
an effective character, that its power is confirmed by the facts.
On the distinction between internal and external effectiviti, see d'Aspremont, 38 NYU J Intl L &
Pol at 901 (cited in note 19). See also d'Aspremont, 20 Leiden J Intl L at 654-655 (cited in note 1)
("There is no doubt that an entity, however well-defined its population and territory may be,
whose government machinery lacks internal and internationaleffectiviti cannot qualify as a state.")
(responding to Joe Verhoeven, La Reconnaissance Internationale: Diclin ou Renouveau?, 39 Annuaire
Franais de Droit International 7 (1993)).
Regarding the dwindling influence of the conditionality of European foreign policy, take as an
example the Africa-EU Summit (Dec 8-9, 2007). In particular, see Stephen Castle, Disputes Deepen
at EU-Afnca Summit; Trade Deal Spurned, and Mugabe's Peers Reject Rsghts Pressure, Intl Herald Trib
N1 (Dec 10, 2007) (explaining how the "gathering designed to help Europeans retain their
traditional influence in Africa... has been challenged by the rise of China'); Stephen Castle, A
Newcomer in the EU's Backyard; EU Seeks To Counter Chinese Influence in Afica at Summit, Intl Herald
Trib N3 (Dec 8, 2007) (describing how although European leaders' concerns about human rights
abuses in Africa had delayed plans to hold the summit, China's growing economic influence in
Africa forced European leaders to attend).
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cause does however not seem to suffice to thwart, in the long run, the march
toward a world where all States will live up to procedural democracy.
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